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Abstract: 
 
Retrospective voting circumvents many of voters‟ cognitive limitations, but if voters‟ 
attributional judgments are systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an 
independent source of political failure.  We design and administer a new survey of the 
general public and political experts to test for such biases.  Our analysis reveals frequent, 
large, robust biases, with an overarching tendency for the public to overestimate 
politicians‟ ability to influence outcomes.  Retrospective voting usually gives elected 
leaders supraoptimal incentives, though there are important cases where the reverse 
holds. 
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Where are we to place responsibility for the conduct of our government?  When we go to 
the polls, who can we hold accountable for the successes and failures of national 
policies?  The president?  The House?  The Senate?  The unelected Supreme Court?  Or, 
given our federal system, the states, where governments are, in their complexity, a 
microcosm of the national government? 
 
Even for those who spend their lives studying politics, these can be extremely difficult 
questions to answer. 
    – Robert Dahl (2002: 115) 
 
1. Introduction 
Voters are not merely ignorant; their beliefs about policy-relevant subjects are often 
systematically biased.  Voters systematically overestimate the fraction of the federal 
budget spent on foreign aid and welfare, and underestimate the fraction spent on Social 
Security and health. (Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University 1995)  Less-
informed voters favor systematically different policies than otherwise identical more-
informed voters. (Althaus 2003, 1998, 1996)  Laymen‟s beliefs about economics, the 
causes of cancer, and toxicology systematically diverge from the beliefs of experts, even 
when matched on traits like income, employment sector, job security, demographics, 
party identification, and ideology. (Caplan and Miller 2010; Caplan 2007, 2002; Lichter 
and Rothman 1999; Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic 1992)  Voters also tend to discount 
evidence in conflict with their pre-existing beliefs. (Taber and Lodge 2006; Bullock 
2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2010)  Taken together, the evidence raises a troubling question: 
If politicians cater to the policy preferences of the median voter, won‟t inefficient and 
counter-productive policies win by popular demand?   
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The strongest reply to this concern is that citizens vote for results, not policies.  As the 
retrospective voting literature argues, politicians win popularity by delivering prosperity, 
peace, safe streets, and well-educated students – not by pandering to the public‟s beliefs 
about the best means to achieve these ends. (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Sanders 
2000; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Lupia 1994; Peltzman 1990; Ferejohn 1986; Kiewiet 
and Rivers 1984; Fiorina 1981; Barro 1973; Key 1967)  One simple heuristic – reward 
success, punish failure – seems to allow voters with little, zero, or even negative 
knowledge about policy to extract socially desirable behavior from their leaders. 
 
Unfortunately for democracy, this heuristic is not as foolproof as it seems.  In order to 
reward success and punish failure, voters need to know which government actors – if any 
– are able to influence the various outcomes voters care about. (Arceneaux 2006; 
Anderson 2006; Cutler 2008, 2004; Rudolph and Grant 2002; Somin 1998; Lewis-Beck 
1997; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Kerr 1975)  As Achen and Bartels (2004a: 6) put it: 
If jobs have been lost in a recession, something is wrong, but is that the president‟s fault? If it is 
not, then voting on the basis of economic results may be no more rational than killing the pharaoh 
when the Nile does not flood...  
Of course, well-functioning democracy does not require “whodunnit” knowledge to be 
universal.  If well-informed voters know the right people to reward and punish, and the 
rest of the electorate votes randomly, politicians still have clear incentives to deliver good 
results. (Surowiecki 2004; Wittman 1995; Page and Shapiro 1993, 1992; Converse 1990)  
The real danger to democracy comes from systematically biased beliefs about political 
influence. (Caplan 2007; Rabin 1998; Thaler 1992; Gilovich 1991)  Just as the market for 
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automobile repair will work poorly if the average customer blames his grocer for engine 
trouble, local elections will work poorly if the average voter blames the president for the 
quality of public schools.   
 
To test the American public‟s beliefs about political influence for systematic bias, we 
designed a new survey, and administered it to two distinct groups: (1) a nationally 
representative sample of Americans, and (2) members of the American Political Science 
Association who specialize in American politics.  One of the main ways that scholars 
have tested for the presence of systematic bias on other topics is to see whether average 
beliefs of laymen and experts diverge. (Caplan 2007; Lichter and Rothman 1999; Kraus, 
Malmfors, and Slovic 1992)  As Kahneman and Tversky describe their method: “The 
presence of an error of judgment is demonstrated by comparing people's responses either 
with an established fact... or with an accepted rule of arithmetic, logic, or statistics.” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1982: 493)  “Established” or “accepted” by whom?  By experts, 
of course.  We extend this approach to questions of political influence.  If laymen and 
experts‟ average beliefs differ, our defeasible presumption is that experts are right and 
laymen are wrong. 
 
Systematically biased attributional beliefs turn out to be common and large.  Fully 14 out 
of 16 survey questions exhibit statistically significant biases.  Compared to experts in 
American politics, the public greatly overestimates the influence of state and local 
governments on the economy, the president and Congress on the quality of public 
education, the Federal Reserve on the budget, Congress on the Iraq War, and the 
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Supreme Court on crime rates.  The public also moderately underestimates the influence 
of the Federal Reserve on the economy, state and local governments on public education, 
and the president and Congress on the budget.  While we are open to the possibility that 
non-cognitive factors explain observed belief gaps, controlling for demographics and 
various measures of self-serving and ideological bias does little to alter our results.  A full 
set of controls reduces the absolute magnitude of the raw belief gaps by less than 13% – 
and leaves the number of statistically significant lay-expert differences unchanged. 
 
Earlier researchers have already identified some systematic biases that undermine 
retrospective voting.  Voters myopically reward and punish politicians for recent 
economic performance.  (Bartels 2010; Achen and Bartels 2008, 2004a)  Partisanship 
heavily distorts voters‟ attributional judgments. (Marsh and Tilley 2009; Rudolph 2006, 
2003a, 2003b; Bartels 2002)  Supporters of incumbent parties are eager to credit the 
government for good outcomes and reluctant to blame it for bad outcomes, opponents of 
incumbent parties do the opposite – and both sides can‟t be right.  Voters also reward and 
punish politicians for outcomes that are clearly irrelevant or beyond their control, such as 
local football victories, world oil prices, and the state of the world economy. (Wolfers 
2011; Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010; Leigh 2009; Achen and Bartels 2004b)  Arceneaux 
and Stein (2006) report that many voters incorrectly blamed the incumbent mayor of the 
city of Houston for the county government‟s flood policy.  Iyengar (1989: 878) finds 
important framing effects: “agents of causal responsibility are viewed negatively while 
agents of treatment responsibility are viewed positively.”  Healy and Malhotra (2009) 
show that voters reward politicians for disaster relief spending, but not disaster 
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prevention spending, even though prevention is demonstrably more cost-effective.  Marsh 
and Tilley (2009), Tilley, Garry, and Bold (2008), Arceneaux and Stein (2006), Rudolph 
(2003a), and Gomez and Wilson (2001) find systematic effects of education and/or 
political sophistication on attributional judgments. 
 
Our original contribution is twofold.  First, to the best of our knowledge, no other paper 
uses a large, representative lay-expert comparison to test whether voters have 
systematically biased beliefs about political influence.
1
  Second, our full array of 
outcomes (macroeconomic performance, budget, education, crime, and the war in Iraq) 
and actors (president, Congress, Supreme Court, Federal Reserve, and state and local 
government) is the largest and most comprehensive to date. (Cutler 2008; Arceneaux 
2006; Atkeson and Partin, 1998, 1995) 
 
Our results do not imply, of course, that the American public‟s beliefs about political 
influence are biased in every conceivable respect.  Voters‟ attributional judgments often 
respond in rational ways to divided government (Rudolph 2003a; Whitten and Palmer 
1999; Lewis-Beck 1997; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Powell 
and Whitten 1993) and federalism (Arceneaux 2006, Anderson 2006, Cutler 2004; Stein 
1990).  Nevertheless, the American public‟s beliefs about political influence are biased in 
some important respects, raising serious questions about the ability of retrospective 
voting to circumvent other slippages in the democratic process. 
                                                 
1
 The only precursor of which we are aware is Cutler (2008: 634), which compares the Canadian public‟s 
attributional beliefs to those of  33 Canadian political scientists specializing in federalism or provincial 
politics. 
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The next section describes the Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes 
Survey.  Section 3 presents our benchmark results.  Section 4 adds controls to address the 
possibility of expert bias.  Section 5 discusses the broader significance of our results.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We administered our Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey in 
two distinct phases – one for laymen, the other for experts.  In phase one, conducted on 
February 13-18, 2008, Zogby International included our questions on an omnibus 
telephone survey of adults nationwide.  The targets were randomly drawn from telephone 
CDs of nationally listed samples, with selection probabilities proportional to population 
size within area codes and exchanges.  Zogby achieved a typical contemporary response 
rate of 14.6%, collecting a total of 1,215 responses.     
 
On March 17, 2008, we initiated phase two of our survey.  We mailed our political 
influence questions –  plus Zogby‟s demographic and control questions – to a subset of 
the American Political Science Association.  The wording and response options of the 
phase two questions were identical to those of the phase one questions.   
 
All APSA members with U.S. addresses who specialize in American politics were 
included in our sample.  To qualify as “specialists in American politics,” APSA members 
had to list at least one of the following fields of interest: federalism/intergovernmental 
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relations, law and courts, legislative studies, public policy, representation/electoral 
systems, presidency research, or state politics and policy.  This yielded 2,894 names, 
approximately 90% of which had U.S. mailing addresses.   
 
APSA members had the option to respond by business reply mail or password-protected 
web script.
2
  We received 577 responses by April 14, 2008, but continued to accept 
responses until July 29, 2008.  By that point we had 673 responses from APSA members, 
with a response rate of 26%. 
 
Table 1 lists the public‟s and political scientists‟ mean responses to our main questions.  
Note that lower numbers indicate more perceived influence.  Table 2 lists both groups‟ 
mean responses to Zogby‟s demographic and control questions.  As expected, political 
scientists are markedly more educated, affluent, male, Democratic, and liberal than the 
general public. 
 
3. Benchmark Results 
In standard rational choice models of belief formation, additional information reduces the 
variance of beliefs without changing their mean. (Sheffrin 1996; Lucas 1973; Muth 1961)  
One implication is that laymen and experts will have the same average beliefs.  As long 
as experts are correct on average, we can test the public‟s political influence beliefs for 
systematic bias simply by checking whether American politics specialists in the APSA 
systematically disagree. (Caplan 2007) 
 
                                                 
2
 The URL for the web script is http://www.bcaplan.com/cgi-bin/apsasurv.cgi. 
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In principle, admittedly, belief gaps could indicate bias in either group – or both.  But 
almost everyone concedes a general presumption in favor of expert consensus.  The 
APSA members in our sample have typically studied American politics for decades.  80% 
of our political scientists – versus just 32% of the public – earned perfect scores on a 
four-question objective political knowledge test included in our survey.  If American 
politics specialists systematically disagree with novices, the novices‟ defenders have to 
provide some reason to undermine the experts‟ credibility. 
 
Before we can consider the main challenges to political scientists‟ credibility, though, we 
must estimate some benchmark results.  We use ordered logits to measure the lay-expert 
belief gap for all of the beliefs in Table 1.  Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients and 
z-stats when our Political Scientist dummy is the sole independent variable. 
 
The initial case for systematic bias is strong.  Differences between political scientists and 
the general public are statistically significant in 15 out of 16 questions; the one exception 
was the president‟s influence on the war in Iraq.  The absolute value of the z-stat>4 in 14 
out of 16 questions.  These beliefs gaps are also fairly large in substantive terms.  The 
average absolute value of the lay-expert gap is .36 on our 4-point scale.   
 
The most obvious difference between political scientists and the public: The public thinks 
that politicians have more influence over outcomes.  11 out of the 15 statistically 
significant belief gaps are positive, indicating that political scientists ascribe less 
influence to politicians than the public does.  The public thinks that all of the actors 
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mentioned in our survey – the president, Congress, the Supreme Court, and state and 
local governments – have more influence over crime rates than political scientists will 
admit.   
 
Still, the pattern is more complex than “political scientists see more randomness in 
politics than the public” or “the public scapegoats leaders for outcomes beyond their 
control.”  For three of our five outcome variables, experts single out political actors with 
influence that the average layman overlooks.  On the economy, political scientists single 
out the Fed.  On the quality of public schooling, political scientists single out state and 
local governments.  On the budget, political scientists single out both Congress and the 
president.  If the consensus of political scientists is correct, the public‟s problem is not 
merely blaming leaders too much, but also showing some crucial actors undue leniency. 
 
Six of the coefficients in the benchmark results are especially large, with z-stats greater 
than ten.  Compared to laymen, political experts think that state and local governments 
have far less influence over the macroeconomy; the president and Congress much less 
influence over education; the Fed much less influence over the budget; Congress much 
less influence over the Iraq War; and the Supreme Court much less influence over crime 
rates. 
 
4. Expert Bias? 
Large, systematic disagreements between laymen and political experts provide prima 
facie evidence of systematic public bias.  But the prima facie case can be rebutted.  
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Political scientists sharply differ from the broader public on several non-cognitive 
dimensions.  They are disproportionately affluent white males.  Since humans often 
suffer from self-serving bias (Dahl and Ransom 1999; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997), 
perhaps the experts‟ comfortable situation and elite status color their perceptions about 
political influence.  Political scientists are also much more liberal and Democratic than 
the general public.  Earlier researchers find that voters‟ political loyalties heavily 
influence their perceptions of political influence. (Marsh and Tilley 2009; Rudolph 
2003a, 2003b)  Perhaps political scientists‟ unique perspective reflects some form of left-
of-center bias, rather than a deeper understanding of American politics. 
 
Fortunately, our data set is rich enough to test both of these doubts about the experts‟ 
credibility.  Suppose political scientists‟ distinctive views stem entirely from self-serving 
bias.  Then controlling for income, sex, race, and other measures of self-interest should 
drive the coefficients on the political science dummy variable to zero.  Similarly, if 
political scientists‟ distinctive views stem entirely from their liberalism, then the 
estimated effect of training in political science should vanish after controlling for party 
identification and ideology. 
 
Self-serving bias.  We re-estimate all of the ordered logits in Table 3 with controls for 
race (with white as the reference category), gender, age, age squared, income, job 
security, and expected income growth.  Table 4 shows (a) the revised coefficients on the 
Political Scientist dummy, (b) the revised z-stats, and (c) the expected beliefs of laymen 
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and experts after setting all of the control variables equal to their median values for the 
lay respondents. 
 
The results offer virtually no support to the self-serving bias hypothesis.  Indeed, after 
adding all of these controls, the PoliSci variable becomes statistically significant in all 16 
equations.  The z-stat exceeds 4 in all but three cases.  The average magnitude of the 
predicted belief gaps is .35, compared to .36 in the raw data.  While political scientists are 
indeed economically and demographically unusual, these potentially self-serving 
differences have no apparent effect on their attributional beliefs. 
 
Ideological bias.  There are persuasive reasons to suspect that at least part of political 
scientists‟ disagreements with the broader public stems from ideological bias.  Political 
scientists are decidedly more Democratic and liberal than the broader population.  Earlier 
research suggests that these political variables will sway political scientists beliefs in two 
ways.   
 
First, since our survey was run during the final troubled year of the Bush administration, 
with both houses of Congress under Democratic control, the evidence on partisan bias 
suggests that political scientists would exaggerate the influence of the president relative 
to other branches of government. (Marsh and Tilley 2009; Rudolph 2006, 2003a, 2003b; 
Bartels 2002)   
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Second, as Rudolph (2003b: 701-2) predicts and broadly confirms, liberals tend to give 
government actors more credit and blame for economic outcomes: “Just as the „ethic of 
self-reliance‟ prevents many people from blaming government for their personal 
economic problems... so too may economic conservatism prevent certain people from 
attributing responsibility for the national economy to government officials.”  Liberals‟ 
belief in governments‟ centrality arguably generalizes to non-economic outcome 
variables as well.  Conservatives might hold, for example, that good schools and safe 
streets depend primarily on family values rather than government policy. 
 
To test the ideological bias hypothesis, we re-estimate all of the ordered logits in Table 3 
with controls for party and ideology.  Since Zogby‟s party questions include an “other 
party” option, and its ideology question includes a “libertarian” option, we add dummy 
variables for “other party” and “libertarian.”  Table 5 shows (a) the revised coefficients 
on the Political Scientist dummy, (b) the revised z-stats, and (c) the expected beliefs of 
laymen and experts after setting all of the control variables equal to their median values 
(party=independent, ideology=moderate) for the lay respondents. 
 
The data provide at best sporadic support for the ideological bias hypothesis.  There are a 
few questions where some form of partisan bias may play a small role.  Conservatives 
think the Supreme Court has more influence over crime rates, and assign marginally more 
budgetary influence to Congress and the president.  For the Fed‟s influence on the 
budget, and the president‟s influence on the Iraq War, party and ideology actually push in 
opposite directions.  But none of these effects are large.  After controlling for ideological 
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bias, the coefficient on the PoliSci dummy remains statistically significant in 14 out of 16 
equations.  The z-stat>4 in all but three cases.  The average magnitude of the lay-expert 
belief gap does not budge from its benchmark level of .36. 
 
A final point of interest: Do political scientists‟ distinctive views reflect their high level 
of education, their training in politics, or some mixture of the two?  In other words, to 
what extent do laymen with graduate educations “think like political scientists”?  To 
answer this question, we re-estimate all of the ordered logits in Table 3 with controls for 
self-serving bias, ideological bias, and educational attainment.  Table 6 shows (a) the 
revised coefficients on the Political Scientist dummy, (b) the revised z-stats, (c) the 
coefficients on Education, (d) and the z-stats for the Education coefficients.  After setting 
all of the other control variables equal to their median values for the lay respondents, 
Table 6 also shows the expected beliefs for laymen with the median level of education 
(some college), laymen with graduate training, and political scientists with graduate 
training. 
 
Training in political science has a much larger effect than educational attainment.  Even 
after controlling for education, the coefficient on the PoliSci dummy remains statistically 
significant in 14 out of 16 equations.  Controlling for training in political science, the 
coefficient on education is statistically significant in 6 out of 16 equations.  There are 
three questions where the PoliSci dummy and education both have statistically significant 
effects in the same direction, two where they have statistically significant effects in the 
opposite direction, and only one (the effect of state and local governments on the quality 
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of public schooling) where controlling for education wipes out the statistically significant 
effect of political expertise. 
 
Controlling for education does reduce the average absolute magnitude of the lay-expert 
belief gap, but only slightly.  The expected belief gap between laymen with the median 
education level and political scientists is .37.  The expected belief gap between laymen 
with graduate education and political scientists, in contrast, is .33.  The gap between 
political scientists and the public therefore reflects roughly 90% training in political 
science, and just 10% education per se. 
 
5. Discussion: The Effects of Bias 
A. Theory 
Retrospective voting is the last, best safety net for democratic efficiency.  The defender 
of democracy can stipulate to all of the electorate‟s alleged inadequacies.  He can accept 
the empirical evidence of the typical voter‟s ignorance (Somin forthcoming, 1998; Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Bennett 1996; Converse 1964) and irrationality (Wolfers 2011; 
Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009; Caplan 2007).  As long as 
these ignorant and irrational voters know enough to reward success and punish failure, 
democracy can still work well. 
 
The defender of democracy can even admit that there is widespread ignorance about 
“who to blame for what.”  Suppose 10% of voters know precisely enough to reward 
success and punish failure, and the rest of the electorate votes randomly.  Then 
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retrospective voting plus the Miracle of Aggregation virtually guarantee democratic 
efficiency, even if the average voter know little, nothing, or less than nothing about 
public policy. (Surowiecki 2004; Wittman 1995)  The defender of democracy can even 
concede that partisans‟ attributional judgments are biased. (Marsh and Tilley 2009; 
Rudolph 2006, 2003a, 2003b)  As long as the median informed voter is not a partisan, 
retrospective voting and the Miracle of Aggregation continue to drive democracy to 
efficient outcomes. 
 
Unfortunately, retrospective voting still requires a largely undefended assumption: 
Voters‟ beliefs about political influence are unbiased.  The Condorcet Jury Theorem 
ceases to imply accurate verdicts if jurors have systematically biased beliefs about guilt.  
With systematically biased beliefs, increasing the size of the decision group actually 
increases the chance of getting a “wrong” decision rather than reducing it (Somin 
forthcoming). Retrospective voting, similarly, ceases to imply democratic efficiency if 
voters have systematically biased beliefs about political influence.   
 
How precisely do systematically biased beliefs about political influence impede 
democratic performance?  There are three basic cases to consider: 
 
Case 1: Underestimating influence.  The social harm of underestimation is 
straightforward.  Retrospective voters who underestimate political actors‟ influence over 
outcomes will be too willing to vote against incumbents when conditions are good, and 
too reluctant to vote against incumbents when conditions are bad.  This in turn weakens 
 17 
politicians‟ incentives to excel and encourages political shirking. (Albouy 2010; Bender 
and Lott 1996; Rose-Ackerman 1980)  If voters falsely attribute the fruit of your efforts 
to luck, why struggle to deliver the goods?  If voters falsely attribute your errors and 
misdeeds to outside failures, why bother with caution and probity?  Shirking may be 
particularly likely when adopting more effective policies is likely to attract the ire of 
influential interest groups. 
 
Admittedly, if a politicians‟ only goal were maximizing votes, then uniformly halving the 
sensitivity of votes with respect to performance would not change his optimal decision.  
Voter bias would be like a surtax on excess profits; if t is an exogenous tax rate, whatever 
maximizes X automatically maximizes (1-t)X. (Hakken 2005)  If a politician has any 
personal, financial, or ideological motive to shirk, however, halving the sensitivity of 
votes to performance increases shirking at the expense of performance. (Somin 2009)  In 
the polar case where voters imagine that politicians have zero influence on outcomes, 
politicians can safely ignore outcomes and devote themselves entirely to shirking.  
Public-minded politicians would still make some effort to produce good results (Besley 
2007), but this would be a charitable donation rather than a self-interested response to 
electoral incentives. 
 
Case 2: Overestimating influence.  The dangers of overestimating politicians‟ influence 
on outcomes are less obvious, but no less real.  Retrospective voters who overestimate 
political actors‟ influence over outcomes will be too eager to vote against incumbents 
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when conditions are bad, and too willing to vote for incumbents when conditions are 
good.   
 
It is tempting to object that the stronger politicians‟ incentives are, the better.  But this is 
simply untrue: In a noisy world, incentives can easily be too strong. Gibbons (2005), 
Baker (2002, 1992), Zenger and Marshall (2000), Sappington (1991), Weitzman (1980), 
and Kerr (1975) analyze a wide range of mechanisms, most of which hinge on agents‟ 
risk-aversion.  But when the key incentive is not compensation, but continuation or 
termination of employment, high stakes may be unwise even with risk-neutral agents.  
Imagine a company that fires its CEO at the end of any day its stock price goes down.  
While the CEO would have a strong incentive to succeed, there are major downsides.  
The firm would inevitably fire many qualified, diligent CEOs.  To attract candidates for 
such an insecure position, the firm would have to boost compensation, settle for lower-
quality leadership, or incur extremely high search costs.  Moreover, the CEO might have 
strong perverse incentives to sacrifice the long-term interests of stockholders in order to 
boost short-term stock prices. Perhaps most importantly, firing CEOs after their first 
losing day would entail frequent disruptive interregnums.  
 
Giving politicians supraoptimal incentives leads to analogous pathologies.  Suppose 
voters overestimate the effect of the nation‟s president on the quality of public schools, 
and vote accordingly: If the public schools don‟t measure up, they fire the incumbent in 
the next election.  This admittedly amplifies presidents‟ incentive to improve public 
schools.  But if the president has little influence in this area, voters will frequently fire 
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high-quality executives who did well given their constraints.  As a result, voters will have 
to boost politicians‟ pay, settle for inferior candidates, or incur additional search costs.  
Overestimation of the incumbent‟s influence in one policy area also leads voters to 
overvalue outcomes in the field relative to other issues.  If the public overestimates the 
president‟s influence on education outcomes, they might focus too much on that issue 
when deciding whether to re-elect him, and not enough on other matters over which he 
has more control, such federal judicial appointments.  Thus, an incumbent with a good 
record on issues where he has a lot of influence could be voted out because of poor 
results in areas where his decisions have little real impact.  The greatest drawback of 
overestimation of political influence, though, may simply be needless disruption every 
time the polity replaces one scapegoat with another. 
 
Overestimation is particularly dangerous when there is a cap on the penalty for failure.  In 
most democracies, for example, the executive‟s worst-case scenario is simply to be voted 
out of office.  As a result, an incumbent with slightly sub par performance has a clear 
incentive to take big risks to make the cut: Heads he wins, tails he suffers the same fate 
he would have met if he played it safe. (Calomiris 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1991). In the 
extreme case, politicians fearing electoral defeat might instigate “diversionary” wars or 
other foreign crises in the hopes of strengthening their standing. (Smith 1996)  If the war 
or crisis results in success, the imperilled leader might stave off electoral defeat.  If it 
ends in defeat, the leader is not much worse off than before, since he was likely to lose 
power anyway. 
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Case 3: Misallocating influence.  The effects of systematically biased beliefs about 
political influence become more complex if voters misallocate influence – i.e.,  reward 
and punish one branch of government for the successes and failures of another.  In this 
situation, standard models of team production (Dixit 2002; McAfee and McMillan 1991; 
Holmström 1982) suggest that retrospective voting will perversely encourage bad 
performance.   
 
Suppose voters underestimate the president‟s influence on the Iraq War, and overestimate 
Congress‟s influence on the same outcome.3  The president might actually have an 
electoral motive to prolong the war.  Even if the president and Congress belong to the 
same party, the president might deliberately underperform in order to enhance his 
bargaining position: If you don‟t cooperate with me, you‟re more likely to lose your job 
than I am.   
 
With divided government and party loyalty, the danger is even greater.  A Republican 
president could improve his party‟s chances of regaining Congress in the next election 
simply by dragging out the war, safe in the knowledge that Congress will shoulder most 
of the blame.  The precise effects of blame-shifting are model-specific, but extremely 
dysfunctional equilibria are plainly possible in theory. 
 
B. Empirics 
                                                 
 
3
 Note that in our actual data on this issue, the public seems to slightly overestimate the president‟s 
influence, and greatly overestimate Congress‟s influence. 
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Our data suggest that all three cases are empirically relevant.  But Case 2 – 
overestimation – predominates.   In our data, voters exaggerate politicians‟ influence, so 
retrospective voters typically overreward politicians for success and overpunish them for 
failure.  This does not mean that reelection rates are too low.  The implication, rather, is 
that reelection rates are too high when outcomes are good, and too low when outcomes 
are bad.  If this conclusion seems implausible, perhaps the reason is that the very idea of 
“supraoptimal incentives” is so counterintuitive.   
 
Still, there are important exceptions to the rule that voters overestimate leaders‟ 
influence.  Our data indicate that voters underestimate the influence of the Federal 
Reserve on the economy, of state and local government on the quality of public schools, 
and of both the president and Congress on the budget.  In these areas, we should expect 
retrospective voters to underreward success and underpunish failure.  If American politics 
specialists know what they are talking about, these are areas where voters should accept 
fewer excuses and demand more results. 
 
Finally, there are at least three outcomes – the economy, public schools, and the budget – 
where voters seem to misallocate influence – to overestimate the role of some actors, 
while underestimating the role of others.  On the economy, the public overestimates the 
role of the president, Congress, and especially state and local governments, while 
underestimating the role of the Federal Reserve.  One surprising but plausible implication 
is that incumbents in state and local government will frequently be scapegoats for the 
central bank‟s mistakes. (Hansen 1999)  For public schooling, similarly, the public 
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overestimates the influence of Congress and the president, while underestimating the role 
of state and local government.  The expected result is that state and local governments 
will habitually shift the blame for their schools‟ shortcomings over to the federal 
government.  On the budget, finally, our data indicate that voters sharply overestimate the 
role of the Fed, and underestimate the influence of Congress and the president.  When 
retrospective voters are dissatisfied with the budget, an unelected body apparently 
siphons off blame from the politicians who actually control the outcome. (Morris and 
Munger 1998; Kane 1980) 
 
At this point, the defender of democratic efficiency might distance himself from the 
strictly retrospective voting model.  Perhaps other factors also influence voters‟ 
decisions, in which case poor retrospective evaluation might not have much effect on 
voting decisions.  To examine this possibility, our survey included two questions to 
directly measure the prevalence of various voting strategies.   
 
The first measures the prevalence of retrospective versus prospective voting: “When 
deciding which candidate to vote for, does the candidate‟s past performance or the 
candidate‟s promise for the future matter more to you?”  The second measures the 
popularity of character versus policy voting: “When deciding which candidate to vote for, 
does the candidate‟s character and values, or the candidate‟s position on policy issues 
matter more to you?”  For both questions, “Both matter equally to me” was a third 
response option.  Table 7 breaks down the results for political scientists and the public. 
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Responses to the first question confirm that retrospective voting is widespread, but far 
from universal.  Over half of the public said “past performance,” and another third said 
“both equally.”  Flawed retrospective evaluations are likely to influence the voting 
decisions of a large majority of the electorate.  The public‟s responses to the second 
question, in contrast, show that character/values voting is only slightly more common 
than policy voting.  Political scientists, in contrast, are markedly more prospective and 
policy-oriented.   
 
Overall, the data support a pluralistic model of voter behavior.  Candidates‟ past 
performance, future promise, character, values, and policy positions all matter.  Since 
retrospective voting is merely one tool in the electorate‟s toolbox, our evidence does not 
conclusively prove that democracy falls short.  However, if the other tools in the 
electorate‟s toolbox are defective, it is naive to expect retrospective voting to 
automatically repair or replace them.  Suppose the electorate systematically 
underestimates the social benefits of free trade. (Caplan 2007)  Politicians competing for 
voters‟ support will embrace free trade despite public opposition as long as voters are 
purely retrospective and their attributional judgments are unbiased.  But if voters count 
politicians‟ policies and outcomes, or if voters reward and blame the wrong politicians 
for outcomes, good economics may well be bad politics. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Voter competence in assessing blame can only be measured against a suitable 
benchmark.  Earlier benchmarks include myopia, sensitivity to exogenous events (e.g. 
 24 
world oil prices, natural disasters, or the state of the world economy), and systematic 
effects of party, education, and political sophistication.  We extend this literature by using 
expert consensus as a benchmark.  We administer identical questions to both a nationally 
representative American sample and American politics specialists from the American 
Political Science Association.  When laymen and experts hold systematically different 
beliefs about political influence, we treat this as prima face evidence of voter bias.   
 
The prima facie evidence of voter bias is strong.  Political scientists and the public 
systematically disagree on 15 out of 16 questions.  Their belief gaps are usually large in 
magnitude and highly statistically significant.  We then explore the robustness of these 
findings by controlling for important non-cognitive differences between political 
scientists and the public.  Political scientists are much more affluent, liberal, Democratic, 
and male than the general population.  It turns out, however, that none of these 
differences explain more than a small fraction of the lay-expert gap.  Even after we add 
education to the list of control variables, over 90% of the raw belief gap between political 
scientists and the public remains. 
 
These findings shed light on two broader topics.  First, they undermine the view that 
systematically biased beliefs about policy can be safely ignored.  Retrospective voting 
may partially mitigate the effect of popular misconceptions about economics, toxicology, 
and other subjects.  But retrospective voting is a flawed filter.  Second, our findings show 
that retrospective voting actually adds new contaminants to the democratic process.  
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Systematically biased beliefs about political influence make some politicians‟ incentives 
overly weak, and others‟ excessively strong. 
 
The most obvious direction for future research is to explore the robustness of our findings 
using other samples and other benchmarks of voter competence.  But perhaps more 
importantly, our research highlights the need for new formal political models that 
incorporate realistic assumptions about human cognition (e.g. Caplan 2003; Kuran and 
Sunstein 1999)  If the president knows that voters will partially blame Congress for his 
errors, how does this change his behavior?  If Congressmen expect to be the president‟s 
scapegoats, how will they respond?  Can both branches profit by creating an unelected 
agency to deflect the blame for bad outcomes?  The best response to unrealistic formal 
models is not to abandon models, but to rebuild them on empirically sound assumptions. 
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Table 1: Perceptions of Political Influence: Summary Statistics 
# Variable Question Mean 
(Public) 
Mean 
(PoliSci) 
This section of questions deals with parts of the government and how much influence 
they have over whether the economy gets stronger or weaker during the next two years.  
Please rate your overall opinion of each of the following as very influential, somewhat 
influential, not very influential or not all influential. 
 
1 ECONSL State and local governments 1.95 2.41 
2 ECONCON Congress 1.66 1.87 
3 ECONPRES President 1.78 1.88 
4 ECONFED Federal Reserve 1.58 1.39 
This next set of questions deals with parts of the government and how much influence 
they have over how well the public schools educate their students.  Please rate your 
overall opinion of each of the following as very influential, somewhat influential, not 
very influential or not all influential. 
 
5 SCHOOLCON Congress 2.19 2.62 
6 SCHOOLSL State and local governments 1.48 1.23 
7 SCHOOLPRES President 2.33 2.83 
This section of questions deals with parts of the government and how much influence 
they have over how money in the federal budget is spent.  Please rate your overall 
opinion of each of the following as very influential, somewhat influential, not very 
influential or not at all influential. 
 
8 BUDFED Federal Reserve 1.99 2.98 
9 BUDCON Congress 1.47 1.16 
10 BUDPRES President 1.67 1.37 
The following deals with parts of the government and how much influence they have 
over whether the U.S. will succeed or fail in the Iraq War.  Please rate your overall 
opinion of each of the following as very influential, somewhat influential, not very 
influential or not at all influential. 
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11 IRAQCON Congress 1.72 2.10 
12 IRAQPRES President 1.47 1.45 
How much influence parts of government have over crime rates is what this next section 
deals with.  Please rate your overall opinion of each of the following as very influential, 
somewhat influential, not very influential or not at all influential. 
 
13 CRIMEPRES President 2.54 2.96 
14 CRIMESC Supreme Court 1.98 2.76 
15 CRIMESL State and local government 1.52 1.55 
16 CRIMECON Congress 2.26 2.63 
1= “very influential”  2= “somewhat influential” 3= “not very influential”  4= “not at all 
influential” 
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Table 2: Demographic/Control Variables: Summary Statistics 
Question Mean 
(Public) 
Mean 
(PoliSci) 
Which of the following best represents your race or ethnic group? 
White, non-Hispanic .88 .93 
Hispanic   .03 .02 
African American   .04 .02 
Asian/Pacific   .01 .01 
Other/mixed   .04 .02 
What is your gender? 
Male .45 .73 
Female .55 .27 
What is your age? 57.49 48.41 
In politics today, do you consider yourself a...? 
Which major party do you usually lean toward? 
-2= “Democrat” -1= “Independent, Lean Democrat” 0= 
“Independent” 1= “Independent, Lean Republican” 2= 
“Republican” 
.04 -1.11 
Other .01 .04 
Which description best represents your political ideology? 
1 = “Progressive/very liberal” 2= “liberal” 3= “moderate” 4= 
“conservative”  5= “very conservative” 
2.85 2.18 
Libertarian .02 .05 
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Which of the following best represents your household income 
last year before taxes? 
1= “Less than $25,000” 2= “$25,000-$34,999”  3= “$35,000-
$49,999” 4= “$50,000-$74,999”  5= “$75,000-$99,999”  6= 
“$100,000 or more” 
3.63 5.15 
Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, 
or not at all concerned about yourself or someone else in your 
household losing their job within the next year? 
1= “Very concerned”  2= “Somewhat concerned” 3= “Not too 
concerned”  4= “Not at all concerned” 
2.64 3.02 
Over the next five years, do you expect your family‟s income to 
grow faster or slower than the cost of living, or do you think it 
will grow at the same pace? 
 
1= “Grow slower than the cost of living”  2=  “It will grow at the 
same pace”  3= “Grow faster than the cost of living” 
2.27 2.07 
Which of the following best describes your highest level of 
education? 
 
1= “Less than high school graduate”  2= “High school graduate”
 3= “Some college” 4= “College graduate” 5= “Graduate 
or professional school after college” 
3.38 4.98 
Political scientist 0.00 1.00 
 30 
Table 3: Benchmark Results – Ordered Logits on PoliSci 
# Variable PoliSci 
Coefficient 
z-stat 
1 ECONSL 1.17 12.50 
2 ECONCON .67 7.30 
3 ECONPRES .42 4.72 
4 ECONFED -.45 -4.61 
5 SCHOOLCON .97 10.78 
6 SCHOOLSL -.87 -7.74 
7 SCHOOLPRES 1.01 11.34 
8 BUDFED 1.90 19.39 
9 BUDCON -1.17 -9.52 
10 BUDPRES -.71 -7.32 
11 IRAQCON .98 10.69 
12 IRAQPRES .09 .85 
13 CRIMEPRES .85 9.47 
14 CRIMESC 1.60 17.05 
15 CRIMESL .21 2.19 
16 CRIMECON .89 9.87 
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Table 4: Controlling for Self-Serving Bias – Ordered Logits on Race Dummies, 
Male, Age, Age
2
, Income, Job Security, Expected Income Growth, and PoliSci 
(Comparisons set variables other than PoliSci equal to medians for the general 
public). 
# Variable PoliSci 
Coefficient 
z-stat Mean 
(Public) 
Mean 
(PoliSci) 
1 ECONSL 1.20 10.57 1.93 2.42 
2 ECONCON .69 6.13 1.56 1.82 
3 ECONPRES .47 4.26 1.71 1.91 
4 ECONFED -.37 -3.11 1.54 1.43 
5 SCHOOLCON .92 8.33 2.17 2.59 
6 SCHOOLSL -.54 -3.97 1.42 1.28 
7 SCHOOLPRES .96 8.76 2.35 2.79 
8 BUDFED 1.69 14.45 1.97 2.84 
9 BUDCON -.81 -5.64 1.40 1.21 
10 BUDPRES -.58 -4.93 1.63 1.43 
11 IRAQCON 1.27 11.01 1.65 2.22 
12 IRAQPRES .38 2.92 1.45 1.60 
13 CRIMEPRES .78 7.17 2.57 2.92 
14 CRIMESC 1.45 12.91 2.00 2.71 
15 CRIMESL .48 4.07 1.50 1.67 
16 CRIMECON .87 7.89 2.25 2.63 
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Table 5: Controlling for Ideological Bias – Ordered Logits on Party, Ideology, and 
PoliSci (Comparisons set variables other than PoliSci equal to medians for the 
general public). 
# Variable PoliSci 
Coefficient 
z-stat Mean 
(Public) 
Mean 
(PoliSci) 
1 ECONSL 1.17 11.34 1.91 2.39 
2 ECONCON .79 7.67 1.60 1.91 
3 ECONPRES .45 4.53 1.70 1.88 
4 ECONFED -.42 -3.91 1.55 1.42 
5 SCHOOLCON .91 9.17 2.15 2.56 
6 SCHOOLSL -.87 -7.04 1.44 1.22 
7 SCHOOLPRES 1.01 10.21 2.30 2.77 
8 BUDFED 1.94 17.98 1.97 2.97 
9 BUDCON -1.13 -8.48 1.43 1.17 
10 BUDPRES -.71 -6.67 1.62 1.39 
11 IRAQCON .96 9.52 1.67 2.10 
12 IRAQPRES .20 1.81 1.40 1.47 
13 CRIMEPRES .83 8.47 2.53 2.91 
14 CRIMESC 1.61 15.50 1.95 2.74 
15 CRIMESL .16 1.53 1.48 1.53 
16 CRIMECON .78 7.84 2.24 2.58 
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Table 6: Controlling for Self-Serving Bias, Ideological Bias, and Education – 
Ordered Logits on Race Dummies, Male, Age, Age
2
, Income, Job Security, Expected 
Income Growth, Party, Ideology, Education, and PoliSci (Comparisons set variables 
other than Education and PoliSci equal to medians for the general public). 
# Variable PoliSci 
Coef. 
z-stat Educ. 
Coef. 
z-
stat 
Mean 
(Public, 
Educ=3) 
Mean 
(Public, 
Educ=5) 
Mean 
(PoliSci, 
Educ=5) 
1 ECONSL 1.21 8.36 .03 .47 1.92 1.94 2.43 
2 ECONCON .84 5.73 -.08 -1.16 1.57 1.52 1.82 
3 ECONPRES .36 2.51 .07 1.07 1.67 1.73 1.87 
4 ECONFED -.29 -1.93 -.07 -1.01 1.55 1.51 1.42 
5 SCHOOLCON .83 5.78 .06 1.01 2.13 2.19 2.56 
6 SCHOOLSL -.25 -1.43 -.25 -3.53 1.45 1.31 1.25 
7 SCHOOLPRES .78 5.53 .18 2.85 2.28 2.45 2.80 
8 BUDFED 1.68 11.45 .09 1.49 1.95 2.04 2.90 
9 BUDCON -.58 -3.19 -.22 -3.14 1.43 1.31 1.20 
10 BUDPRES -.68 -4.51 .04 .55 1.60 1.63 1.41 
11 IRAQCON 1.39 9.52 -.15 -2.31 1.67 1.56 2.15 
12 IRAQPRES .51 3.02 -.05 -.68 1.44 1.41 1.60 
13 CRIMEPRES .55 3.89 .19 3.06 2.51 2.68 2.92 
14 CRIMESC 1.34 9.31 .12 1.91 1.97 2.08 2.73 
15 CRIMESL .64 4.15 -.17 -2.55 1.52 1.41 1.62 
16 CRIMECON .78 5.42 .01 .08 2.25 2.25 2.58 
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Table 7: Voting Strategy Prevalence 
When deciding which candidate to vote for, does the candidate‟s past performance or the 
candidate‟s promise for the future matter more to you? 
 Past performance Both Equally Future Promise 
Public 54% 32% 14% 
PoliSci 29% 64% 7% 
When deciding which candidate to vote for, does the candidate‟s character and values, or 
the candidate‟s position on policy issues matter more to you? 
 Character/Values Both Equally Policy Issues 
Public 35% 39% 27% 
PoliSci 6% 45% 49% 
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